Surveys of Recent Developments in Third Circuit and
New Jersey Law
In this survey section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents surveys of recent Third Circuit and New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, the Law Review hopes to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of
interestingchanges in significant areas of practice.
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ABSENT INJURY
STANDING FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE WITHIN THE ZONE OF PROTECTION ESTABLISHED UNDER SECTION
10(B) AND RULE IOB-5, STANDING TO ASSERT A CAUSE OF ACTION IS
Trump Hotels &
DENIED, REGARDLESS OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT Casino Resorts, Inc. v. MirageResorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1998).

The Huron North Redevelopment Area (H-Tract), a parcel of
land located in the Marina District of Atlantic City, is 178 acres of
wetland that had been used as a municipal landfill until the 1960s.
See Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d
478, 480 (3d Cir. 1998). Despite the high cost of cleanup of contaminated and hazardous waste, the City Council of Atlantic City implemented a plan to entice developers to invest in the plot and add
to the Atlantic City gaming industry.
The City Council of Atlantic City initiated the plan by authorizing the City Planning Board (Board) to prepare a Redevelopment
Plan (Plan) for the H-Tract. See id. at 481. On April 12, 1995, the
City Council of Atlantic City adopted the Plan prepared by the
Board. Mirage Resorts Incorporated (Mirage), a major developer in
Las Vegas, indicated interest in building a casino complex on the HTract. Shortly thereafter, Atlantic City and Mirage formed numerous
agreements regarding the H-Tract's transformation into a gambling
mecca for hopeful Atlantic City visitors. The agreements between
Mirage and Atlantic City enabled Mirage to acquire and develop the
H-Tract into a multi-casino resort complex provided that Mirage
would clean up the contamination that plagued the land. The cost
of such clean-up procedures may at times be considerable, yet the
NewJersey Legislature promulgated legislation that provided partial
reimbursement to those who invested in the land and agreed to rid it
of contamination.
The Plan conditioned Mirage's H-Tract clean-up efforts on a
host of obligations on the part of the City. The prime contingency
associated with the Plan was the construction of a highway called the
"Westside Connector." The Westside Connector would connect the
Atlantic City Expressway to Brigantine Boulevard by a 2.2-mile roadway and a 2,000-foot tunnel. The purpose of the highway was to facilitate access to the Mirage development on the H-Tract. The New
Jersey Department of Transportation (DOT) and Mirage entered
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into a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the design and
construction of the Westside Connector. Shortly thereafter, Mirage
entered into a Road Development Agreement (Agreement) with the
State of New Jersey and other transportation authorities. The
Agreement addressed the obligations of Mirage and the transportation authorities associated with the construction of the Westside
Connector and set forth the financing for its construction. The financing consisted of $110 million in proceeds from the issuance of
bonds through the South Jersey Transportation Authority (SJTA).
The Agreement dictated that the bonds would be collateralized and
paid from the casino parking and investment funds and other investment tax obligations of other casinos to be located on the HTract.
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts (Trump) is the largest developer in the Atlantic City area and owns three of the existing thirteen
casinos. The Trump Castle is one of Trump's casinos and is located
in close proximity to the H-Tract. See id. at 481-82. Trump alleged
that the construction of the Westside Connector coupled with the
development of the H-Tract would adversely affect its business. See
id. at 482. Secondly, Trump was concerned that the construction of
the Westside Connector would block access to Trump Castle.
Thirdly, Trump alleged that the roadway would increase traffic and
cause more congestion, a problem that already inhibits Atlantic City
casino patronage. Furthermore, Trump claimed that the Westside
Connector would bifurcate the city and cause distress to the boardwalk area, where Trump's Taj Mahal and Trump Palace casinos are
located. Lastly, Trump contended that the contamination and hazardous waste of the H-Tract development would endanger the community.
On March 14, 1997, Trump filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of NewJersey against Mirage, the
State of NewJersey, the NewJersey DOT, the SJTA, the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority, and the NewJersey Transportation
Trust Fund. See id. Trump sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the sale of the bonds necessary for the project. See id. Such
an injunction would halt the construction of the Westside Connector
and the development of the H-Tract. See id. Trump claimed that the
use of the bonds to fund the Westside Connector would violate the
New Jersey Constitution. See id. Further, Trump claimed that nondisclosure of this material violation to the potential purchasers of the
bonds would constitute a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
of the Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act) of 1934, among other
violations. See id.
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In response, Mirage filed a motion to dismiss Trump's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) (FRCP),
claiming that Trump's allegations failed to state a claim. See id. Simultaneously, Mirage filed a complaint in the New Jersey Superior
Court, Law Division, seeking a declaration of the constitutionality of
the funded projects. See id.
On May 1, 1997,Judge Orlofsky of the district court granted Mirage's motion and dismissed all of the federal claims under FRCP
12(b) (6), and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law claims that alleged violations of the New Jersey Constitution. See id. at 482-83. Judge Orlofsky opined that Trump did not
have standing to seek injunctive relief because its claims were not
connected to the securities fraud allegations and, therefore, did not
constitute an injury within the scope of the Exchange Act. See id. at
482. The court exercised its discretion to refuse to hear Trump's
state claims, thereby leaving it to the state courts to interpret the
New Jersey Constitution. See id. at 483. Trump then appealed the
district court's dismissal of the 10b-5 claim and refusal to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction as to the related state claims. See id.
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that Trump lacked standing
to seek injunctive relief to stop the issuance of the bonds. See id.
Writing for the court, Judge McKee commenced the analysis by explaining the text of the securities law at issue. See id. at 484. Judge
McKee noted that pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
"li]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ...to use
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules." Id. (citing Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b) (1994)). Further, the
judge explained, the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5 pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
Judge McKee stated that the Rule prohibits the use of any materially
false or misleading statements or omissions or any "device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud. .. in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security." Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. Section 240.1Ob-5 (1996)).
Judge McKee acknowledged that the operative phrase in Section
10(b) for purposes of this analysis was "in connection with the purchase and sale of any security." Id. Judge McKee determined that
because Trump never alleged that it intended to purchase the bonds
when and if they were issued, the threshold issue was whether Trump
had standing, since it was neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities. See id.

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 29:367

First, the judge explained the three elements of standing under
Article III of the United States Constitution, elaborating on the most
fundamental of the three. See id. The judge noted that the first requirement, paramount in the case at bar, was the "injury in fact"
prong which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that it suffered an
actual and particularized injury to a protected legal interest. See id.
The court then posited that the alleged injury to Trump from the
proposed new construction and development was too remote from
the sale of bonds to be considered an injury resulting from the issuance of the bonds. See id. at 484-85.
Second, Judge McKee determined that the federal judiciary has
adhered to other principles concerning the question of standing. See
id. Judge McKee stated that the essence of standing principles is the
"zone of interests" consideration. See id. at 485. The judge explained that in order to be deemed protected, Trump's complaint
must fit within the zone of interests that the Exchange Act was
promulgated to protect and regulate. See id. The court implied that
assuming that Trump alleged an injury sufficient for Article III
standing, the fraud claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 still
might not fit within the zone of interests of the Exchange Act to establish the nexus required under the statute. See id.
The court addressed the zone of interests principle in the context of standing by analyzing Birnbaum, the seminal case on this
point. See id. (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464
(2d Cir. 1952)). Judge McKee noted that the "Birnbaum Rule" set
forth the principle that Rule 1Ob-5 "'extended protection only to the
defrauded purchaser or seller.'" Id. (quoting Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at
464). Judge McKee noted that the Supreme Court has expressly upheld this principle. See id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)). Despite precedent, Judge McKee continued the court's analysis and focused on the relief Trump was seeking. See id. The judge noted that Trump argued that precedent such
as Birnbaum applied to private damages, whereas Trump was seeking
injunctive relief. See id. The court acknowledged this distinction and
commented on a recent Third Circuit ruling in which the court
carved out an exception to the Birnbaum purchaser/seller rule and
allowed non-purchasing or non-selling claimants to bring a cause of
action if the relief sought was injunctive. See id. at 485-86 (citing Kahan v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970)).
Continuing, Judge McKee defended such "relaxed standing"jurisprudence, yet distinguished it from the instant circumstances. See
id. at 486. The judge observed that, as articulated by the Kahan
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court, "relaxed standing" principles were implemented to prevent
injustice to current shareholders of a security, regardless of whether
the claimants were purchasers or sellers. See id. at 485-86 (citing Kahan, 424 F.2d at 171). The judge explained that the injunctive relief
was a mechanism sought to protect securities already owned. See id.
at 486 (citing Kahan, 424 F.2d at 173).
Distinguishing the case at bar, Judge McKee noted that Trump
was not a potential purchaser, potential seller, or a current holder of
the bonds. See id. Therefore, rather than address the issue as to the
application of the "relaxed standing" doctrine of Kahan, Judge
McKee denied Trump standing because the injury Trump alleged
was not within the protection or zone of interests of the Exchange
Act. See id. Thus, the court suggested that regardless of whether the
relief sought is compensatory or injunctive, the claimant must still
satisfy the traditional nexus requirement for standing and establish
that the injuries suffered stemmed from the 10b-5 violations alleged.
See id.
Accordingly, the court reasoned that even if it did apply
"relaxed standing" principles, Trump's attenuated injuries were not
related to the securities fraud alleged. See id. Judge McKee emphasized that Trump failed to establish the required nexus between the
alleged injuries and the alleged security violation. See id. The court
explained that although the construction of the Westside Connector
and the development of the H-Tract might have adversely affected
Trump, such injury would not have been the result of any securities
fraud. See id. at 487. Therefore, the court declared that Trump did
not have standing to sustain a securities fraud claim and that its
claim for injunctive relief did not satisfy prudential standing requirements under either Kahan or Blue Chip. See id. at 486.
In conclusion, the Third Circuit remarked that the cornerstone
of the Exchange Act is to protect the investing public from manipulative trading practices and to mandate proper disclosure to allow
the investing public to make informed decisions regarding the purchase or sale of securities. See id. at 487. The court explained that
such protection, extended by both the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is axiomatic in the utility of the
capital markets. Despite the allegation that the bonds would be issued without disclosing to the investing public that such funding
may violate the NewJersey Constitution, the court ended the analysis
at the standing issue and held that Trump's injuries were much too
tenuous to fall under the protection of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. See id.
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In Trump, the Third Circuit has demonstrated that the impetus
of the zone of interests requirement is the desire to afford redress
only to plaintiffs who have suffered an injury and who seek protection under the law promulgated to protect such injury. As elastic as
courts have interpreted the protection of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 to be, the perpetual goal of the statute is to prevent securities
fraud. Any fraud presumed in Trump would be the failure to disclose
material information to potential purchasers and sellers of the
bonds, which is the alleged unconstitutionality of the bond issuance.
Thus, the zone of interests consideration in the standing analysis
serves as a gatekeeper to such undeserving claims. To extend the
zone of interests of Section 10(b) to injuries that the legislature did
not intend to protect would be an aberration from this particular
statute and to future legislation as well.
Trump serves as an example of why it is imperative that courts interpret legislation such as the Exchange Act according to the legislature's intent. Such an interpretation does not suggest that courts
may not at times transcend the letter of its content, as some courts
have rightfully done in applying the Exchange Act. But to implement policies not intended within the lexicon of a particular law is
unconstitutional and democratically unsound. The Trump court's
analysis of the zone of interests protected by the Exchange Act advances the legislative goals of the Exchange Act and yet does not impose a transcendental interpretation of the law that exceeds its intended reach.
Robert S. Bournias
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BANKRUPTCY LAW REORGANIZATION ADMINISTRATION ACRIMONY BETWEEN THE DEBTOR AND ITS CREDITORS MAY AT TIMES
RISE TO THE LEVEL OF "CAUSE" THEREFORE REQUIRING THE
APPOINTMENT OF A TRUSTEE WHOSE COUNSEL MAY NOT BE
DISQUALIFIED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF AN APPEARANCE OF A
CONFLICT OF INTEREST - In re Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 140
F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1998).
Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc. and other related entities
(collectively, Marvel) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on
December 27, 1996, and initially operated as a debtor in possession.
See In re Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir.
1998) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107-1108 (1994)). At the time of filing,
Marvel owed nearly one billion dollars to approximately 1,700 creditors.
Various holding companies controlled by Ronald Perelman
held substantially all of Marvel's stock at the time of filing. The
stock, however, served as collateral for a pre-petition issue of bonds,
a substantial amount of which were acquired by Carl Icahn after the
bankruptcy filing through Westgate International, L.P. and High
River Limited Partnership (the Icahn interests).
Disputes between the Icahn interests and other significant Marvel creditors (the Lenders) developed almost immediately and the
hostilities intensified throughout the bankruptcy proceedings. First,
the Icahn interests opposed Perelman's initial bankruptcy financing
proposal, which granted priority status to the Lender's claims.
Then, the Icahn interests fought to gain control of the Marvel Board
of Directors by petitioning for the removal of the automatic bankruptcy stay so that it could foreclose on the defaulted bonds and vote
the stock. The bankruptcy court, however, temporarily thwarted
these efforts by granting Marvel's request for a temporary restraining
order.
Next, the Icahn interests proposed a financing plan that included a $365 million capital infusion by Icahn in exchange for the
exclusive control of Marvel's operations. The Lenders, led by Chase
Manhattan Bank (Chase), fiercely opposed this plan and it also
failed. In a further effort to frustrate the Icahn interests, the Lenders petitioned the bankruptcy court to appoint either an officer or a
trustee to control the bankruptcy.
The dispute culminated on May 14, 1997, when the district
court lifted the temporary restraining order, thereby allowing the
Icahn interests to vote the pledged stock. The Icahn interests finally
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took over Marvel on June 20, 1997, thus becoming the debtor in possession as well as a significant creditor of the entities that controlled
the company. Settlement negotiations between the Icahn interests,
Chase directly, and the Lenders generally led to two proposals. See
id. at 468. Neither proposal, however, could garner the approval of
two thirds of all the creditors as required under the Bankruptcy
Code.
Finally, on October 30, 1997, Icahn-controlled Marvel, as
debtor-in-possession, filed a nineteen-count complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware against the Perelman companies, the Lenders, and other creditors. See id. Marvel
sought either the voidance of the Lender's claims or the subordination of these claims to the High River and Westgate claims. See id.
Additionally, Marvel requested that all related bankruptcy matters be
removed to the district court and resolved in conjunction with the
current litigation. See id. The Lenders opposed this removal and
again requested that the bankruptcy court appoint a trustee. See id.
Ultimately the Lenders consented to removing the bankruptcy
claims to the district court. See id. On December 13, 1997, the district court authorized the appointment of a trustee, which the Icahn
interests appealed. See id. at 469. The United States Trustee nominatedJohnJ. Gibbons (Gibbons) as trustee. See id. Upon receiving
this recommendation, Gibbons acknowledged that his law firm, Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger, & Vecchione, P.C. (the Firm), was
representing Chase in a minor, unrelated financing transaction. See
id. Gibbons explained, however, that Chase had provided the Firm
with a conflict waiver and an authorization allowing the firm to represent Gibbons in matters adverse to Chase. See id.
The district court subsequently appointed Gibbons as trustee on
December 22, 1997. See id. Upon appointment, Gibbons sought to
hire the Firm as trustee's counsel. See id. The Firm also disclosed its
previous and current representations of Chase. See id. Because of
this relationship, the Icahn interests challenged the Firm's employment, asserting that it was not "disinterested" as defined by the
Bankruptcy Code. See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1994)). Shortly
thereafter, the Firm completed its representation of Chase. See id.
At a hearing held on January 15, 1998, to address the Firm's employment, the Icahn interests argued that although the termination
of the Chase/Firm relationship eliminated any actual conflict of interest problems, there still remained an appearance of conflict that
could impact decisions of the trustee. See id. On January 28, 1998,
the district court denied the Firm's employment on the basis of that
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apparent conflict, concluding that the Firm's prior representation of
Chase clouded the image of objectivity required of both trustee and
counsel. See id. Gibbons promptly appealed and his appeal was consolidated with the Icahn interests' previous appeal regarding the appointment of a trustee. See id. at 469-70.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court's appointment of a trustee, holding first that the district court acted within its discretion in finding
that the level of acrimony between the Icahn interests and Marvel's
creditors amounted to sufficient "cause" to warrant the appointment
of a trustee. See id. at 472 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994)).
Secondly, the court held that the appointment of a trustee was in the
best interest of all the parties involved because of this acrimony. See
id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2)). The Third Circuit reversed, however, the district court's denial of the Firm's employment, holding
that when no actual or potential conflict exists, a firm cannot be disqualified as trustee's counsel under § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
solely on the basis of an appearance of a conflict. See id. at 477-78.
Judge Aldisert, writing for a unanimous panel, acknowledged
that the circuits were split on whether a bankruptcy trustee appointment was interlocutory or final and thus began the court's analysis by
considering the Third Circuit's jurisdiction over the appeals. See id.
at 470. The judge recognized that a more liberal concept of finality
is applied to bankruptcy appeals. See id. (citing In re Amatex Corp.,
755 F.2d 1034, 1034 (3d Cir. 1985)). Judge Aldisert noted that the
potential effect of the matter on the bankruptcy estate, res judicata
and collateral estoppel considerations, and judicial economy all factor into a finality decision. See id.
In light of this broader view of finality, the court took a practical approach in deciding to assert jurisdiction over this appeal of an
order appointing a bankruptcy trustee. See id. at 470. Judge Aldisert
reasoned that if the court did not assert jurisdiction at this point, the
appointment of a trustee would never be meaningfully reviewed. See
id. Further, Judge Aldisert noted that no reviewing court, when
faced with a completed Chapter 11 reorganization, would destroy the
years of negotiation and effort by reversing the appointment of a
trustee and sending the proceedings back to start anew. See id. The
court applied similar considerations in deciding to take jurisdiction
over Gibbons's appeal of the denial of the Firm's employment as
counsel. See id. at 471. The Third Circuit argued that since it had
taken jurisdiction over the appeal of the trustee appointment, judi-
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cial economy and practicality warranted hearing this related appeal.
See id.
After deciding the jurisdictional issue, the court then addressed
whether the district court abused its discretion in appointing a trustee in this Chapter 11 bankruptcy action. See id. Judge Aldisert first
outlined the statutory requirements for an appointment of a trustee.
See id. Thejudge explained that a district court can appoint a trustee
either for cause (including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross
mismanagement of the debtor's affairs) or if a trustee would serve
the best interests of all parties. See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)).
The judge stressed that there is a general presumption against the
appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 reorganization because the
debtor in possession is often best suited to conduct a rehabilitation.
See id. Therefore, the court held that a moving party must demonstrate the need for a trustee through "clear and convincing evidence." See id.
Acknowledging the issue as one of first impression in the Third
Circuit, Judge Aldisert next examined whether acrimony between a
debtor and its creditors could ever amount to "cause," thereby mandating the appointment of a trustee. See id. at 472. The judge asserted that while a trustee must be appointed upon a showing of
cause, "a determination of cause ...is within the discretion of the
court." See id. (quoting In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1226
(3d Cir. 1989)). The Third Circuit declared that the statutory list of
causes is not exclusive and instructed that a court's determination of
cause be guided by the Bankruptcy Code's goal of protecting creditors while affording debtors a second opportunity to conduct a rehabilitation. See id. Judge Aldisert proclaimed that the Bankruptcy
Code did not preclude a court from appointing a trustee because of
the level of acrimony between the debtor and creditor. See id. However, the judge noted that no per se rule required the appointment
of a trustee merely because such acrimony existed between the parties. See id. at 472-73.
In so concluding, the court adopted the reasoning employed by
the Fifth Circuit in In re Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., 74 F.3d
599 (5th Cir. 1996) (adopting on rehearing the dissenting opinion
in Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 69 F.3d
746, 751 (5th Cir. 1995)). See Marvel, 140 F.3d at 473. Judge Aldisert
explained that under Cajun Electric, the appointment of a trustee
based on acrimony between the parties is appropriate on a case-bycase basis, when the conflicts between the debtor and creditors extend beyond the natural conflicts between the two parties or when
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the parties begin to work "at cross-purposes." See id. at 472-73. After
considering the commencement of adversary litigation by Marvel,
the parties' failure to reach a settlement, and the parties' apparent
inability to cooperate with each other, the Third Circuit concurred
with the district court's finding of a deep conflict between the Icahncontrolled debtor in possession and the creditors. See id. at 473.
Moreover, Judge Aldisert focused on the unique position held
by the Icahn interests as both significant creditors of the Perelman
companies and the debtor in possession responsible for the formulation of a reorganization plan. See id. Therefore, the judge questioned whether the Icahn interests could reasonably act as fiduciaries
to Marvel's other creditors. See id. Specifically, the court pointed to
the Icahn interests' initiation of the litigation with the Perelman
companies as an example of their inability to discharge their fiduciary duties. See id. at 474. In light of these circumstances, the Third
Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in finding that
there was sufficient cause to warrant the appointment of a trustee.
See id.
Alternatively, the Third Circuit declared that even if the level of
acrimony in the instant case was insufficient for a finding of cause
under § 1104(a)(1), the appointment of a trustee was still proper
under the more flexible "best interest of the parties and estate" standard afforded by § 1104(a)(2). See id. Judge Aldisert observed that
trustees are often appointed when the intensity of conflict between
the parties results in gridlock and complicate the entire reorganization process. See id. at 474-75 (citing Petit v. New England Mortgage
Services, Inc., 182 B.R. 64, 70 (D. Me. 1995)). Therefore, because of
the increasing hostilities between these parties and their apparent
inability to resolve the issues in dispute, the Third Circuit concluded
that the appointment of a trustee was in the best interest of the parties and the estate. See id. at 475.
After holding that the district court did not err in appointing a
trustee, the court then addressed the issue of the Firm's employment. See id. Judge Aldisert began by examining the statutory provision governing the employment of trustee counsel. See id. The court
stated that a trustee may hire an attorney who does not maintain "an
interest adverse to the estate." See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 327(a)).
The judge, however, explained that a court will disapprove of the
employment of a lawyer who has previously represented a creditor "if
there is an actual conflict of interest." See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §
Additionally, Judge Aldisert highlighted that trustee's
327(c)).
counsel must be a "disinterested person," which Congress has de-
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fined as one without "an interest materially adverse to the interest of
the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by
reason of any direct or indirect relationship" to the debtor or other
persons, or for any other reason. See id. at 475-76. (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§ 101 (14) (E) (1994)).
The Third Circuit previously interpreted these statutory standards in In re BH&P, Inc., 949 F.2d 1300 (3d Cir. 1991). See Marvel
140 F.3d at 476. Judge Aldisert, however, criticized Gibbons, the
Icahn interests, and the district court for misreading the court's
opinion. See id. at 476. In an effort to clarify the standards, the court
reiterated the holding of BH&P. See id. The court declared that
while an attorney with an actual conflict is per se disqualified and
while the court may, in its discretion, disqualify an attorney with a
potential conflict, the appearance of conflict alone is an insufficient
basis on which to disqualify an attorney. See id. The Third Circuit
therefore rejected the Icahn interests' assertion that the mere appearance of a conflict is sufficient grounds for disqualifying trustee's
counsel. See id. Additionally, the court rejected Gibbons's contention that the Firm may be disqualified only upon a showing of an actual conflict of interest. See id. at 477.
Specifically, Judge Aldisert chastised the Icahn interests for basing their "appearance of a conflict" argument on a marginal comment made in a section of the BH&P opinion in which conflict of
interest issues were not being decided. See id. Conversely, the judge
emphasized that the Third Circuit addressed only actual and potential conflicts in its primary discussion of conflicts. See id. Moreover,
the judge pointed to explicit language in BH&P's discussion of the
"disinterested person" requirement and concluded that the court
did not intend for apparent conflicts alone to be the basis on which
to disqualify trustee's counsel as "interested." See id.
Judge Aldisert, quoting directly from BH&P, acknowledged that
"'in some circumstances, the potential for conflict and the appearance of conflict may, without more, justify removing a trustee from
service."' See id. (quoting BH&P, 949 F.2d at 1313) (emphasis
added). The judge, however, by focusing narrowly on the conjunctive reference in the quote, concluded that while together, potential
and apparent conflicts may warrant disqualification, apparent conflicts by themselves are insufficient. See id. Therefore, the Third Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion because it applied an incorrect legal standard in disqualifying the Firm solely
because of an appearance of conflict. See id. at 478.
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Finally, Judge Aldisert considered whether the Firm should be
disqualified because of an actual or potential conflict and ultimately
concluded that none existed. See id. at 477. The court explained
that even the Icahn interests conceded as much when they expressed
their concern with the "appearance of 'possible unfairness and partiality."' See id. The judge observed that the Firm's representation of
Chase involved matters completely unrelated to the present case. See
id. Additionally, the court remarked that the Firm had ended its attorney/client relationship prior to Gibbons's appointment as trustee. See id. Further evidencing a practical approach, the court remarked that if it were to affirm the district court's decision in these
circumstances, no firm that had previously represented a secured
creditor could ever serve as trustee's counsel. See id.
Judge Aldisert concluded by deriding the district court for
reaching the illogical conclusion that Gibbons, although a name
partner in the Firm, could serve as trustee while his firm could not
serve as his counsel, and for applying an incorrect legal standard in
reaching the decision below. See id.
By declaring that acrimony between debtors and creditors in a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy may result in the appointment of a trustee,
the Third Circuit has now subjected itself, as well as the bankruptcy
courts and the district courts, to a potential flood of trustee petitions. As the court itself conceded, conflicts between the debtor and
its creditors are inherent in a Chapter 11 proceeding. Unfortunately, the court gave no guidance to assist the district courts in distinguishing between these inherent conflicts and conflicts that warrant the appointment of a trustee. Instead, the court merely
announced a vague standard that will prove to be a vehicle by which
uncooperative parties can further delay the reorganization process.
Patrick O'Byrne
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FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW ELIGIBILITY FOR BENEFITS AS
MEDICALLY NEEDY - AN INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT IN THE
NAME OF A SPOUSE REMAINING IN THE COMMUNITY CAN BE INCLUDED
AS A RESOURCE IN DETERMINING MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY OF THE
OTHER SPOUSE ADMITTED TO A NURSING HOME - Mistrick v. Division
of Med. Assistance and Health Services, 154 N.J. 158, 712 A.2d 188
(1998).
Sophie and Joseph Mistrick were married in 1972 and lived together until Sophie's institutionalization at Wayne View Convalescent Center in October 1994. See Mistrick v. Division of Med. Assistance
and Health Services, 154 N.J. 158, 161, 712 A.2d 188, 190 (1998). Joseph's employer, International Specialty Products, had established a
401(k) program in which Joseph participated and which he utilized
as a retirement account. Upon retirement in April 1995, Joseph
rolled these funds over into an already existing individual retirement
account (IRA) in his name, subsequently receiving $1,060 each
month from this account. Joseph's monthly retirement income also
included $1,220 from Social Security and $178 from a separate pension fund.
Following Sophie's admission to the long-term nursing facility,
she andJoseph experienced a significant decrease in their net worth
as a result of "spending-down," using personal assets to pay for nursing home costs prior to becoming Medicaid eligible. See id. at 162,
712 A.2d at 190. Joseph applied for institutional Medicaid benefits
on Sophie's behalf in August 1995 at a time when he retained the
house, a $24,000 non-institutionalized ("community") spouse resource allowance, and his IRA. See id. at 161-62, 712 A.2d at 190.
The Passaic County Board of Social Services (Board) denied the
benefit application based on a finding that Joseph's IRA was an
available resource in deciding Sophie's Medicaid eligibility. See id. at
162, 712 A.2d at 190. The Board considered Joseph's IRA and determined that the amount placed Sophie above the $2,000 eligibility
limit. Upon Sophie's request for a hearing, the matter was referred
to the Office of Administrative Law by the Appellate Division of
Medical Assistance (Division).
Following a plenary hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ)
concluded that Joseph's IRA, including the funds derived from the
401 (k) Plan, should not have been considered an available resource
in determining Medicaid eligibility. See id. The ALJ recommended
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to the Division that the couple's resources be recalculated without
including these funds. See id. The final agency decision accepted
the ALJ's findings of fact. See id. The Division Director rejected the
ALJ's conclusions of law, however, and determined thatJoseph's IRA
should be included in considering Sophie's eligibility for Medicaid.
See id., 712 A.2d at 190-91.
On appeal to the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
the court reversed the agency decision and remanded the matter for
re-calculation of the couple's resources, exclusive of the IRA. See id.,
712 A.2d at 191. The court noted that in addition to providing required assistance under the federal Medicaid program to categorically needy individuals, NewJersey opted to provide aid, also authorized by Medicaid, to medically needy individuals. See id. at 163, 712
A.2d at 191. The court opined that under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (the Act), the methodology used to identify includable income and resources for purposes of Medicaid eligibility of medically
needy applicants can be "no more restrictive" than that used to determine eligibility for individuals seeking Supplemental Security Income (SSI). See id. Relying on 20 C.F.R. § 416.1202(a), which excludes spousal pension plans and IRAs in determining eligibility for
SSI benefits, the court concluded that Joseph's IRA was not an includable asset in determining Sophie's Medicaid eligibility as a
medically needy applicant. See id. at 164, 712 A.2d at 191.
The appellate division held that the Act's "no more restrictive"
provision precludes states from imposing eligibility exclusions for
the medically needy that are more restrictive than those applicable to
the categorically needy, a class of individuals that includes SSI recipients. See id. Under New Jersey Medicaid regulations, pension plans
and IRAs of non-institutionalized spouses are not necessarily excluded from the eligibility considerations for institutionalized
spouses. See id. However, the court held that the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, in conjunction with the "no more restrictive"
provision of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(c)(i)(II), requires exclusion of such resources. See id. at 164-65, 712 A.2d at 191-92. The
court found that in assessing various components of income under
this statutory scheme, there can be no disparate treatment between
the categorically needy and the medically needy. See id. The court
also denied the Division's motion for reconsideration. See id. at 165,
712 A.2d at 192.
Even though Sophie Mistrick had subsequently died, rendering
the immediate legal issue moot, the New Jersey Supreme Court
granted the Division's petition for certification, noting that the issue
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was capable of repetition and of significant public importance. See
id. In reversing the judgment of the appellate division, the NewJersey Supreme Court held that an IRA in the name of a noninstitutionalized spouse is an includable resource in determining the
Medicaid eligibility of his or her institutionalized spouse. See id. at
177, 712 A.2d at 198.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Stein commenced the
analysis by noting that the Medicaid program is a cooperative initiative of the federal government and participating states. See id. at 16566, 712 A.2d at 192. Justice Stein explained that the Medicaid program is designed to provide public assistance to the poor and is governed by both federal and state statutory and regulatory schemes. See
id. Quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a) (17) (A), the justice explained
that states are required to formulate a plan consistent with Medicaid
objectives that incorporates reasonable eligibility standards for its
own citizens in addition to determining the extent of benefits. See id.
at 166, 712 A2d at 192. The court noted that the authority of the
Department of Human Services to administer such a plan is derived
from the NewJersey Medical Assistance and Health Services Act. See
id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4D-1 (1970)).
Justice Stein proceeded to explain that states participating in
the Medicaid program must provide aid to the categorically needy, a
classification of persons including those qualifying for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and SSI benefits. See id.
(citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a) (10) (A) (i) (1994)). The justice further explained that states may opt, as New Jersey has, to provide
benefits to a medically needy class of individuals including those unable to meet their medical expenses, but with resources sufficient to
preclude their eligibility for AFDC or SSI enrollment. See id. at 16667, 712 A.2d at 193. The court also mentioned that states are permitted to provide assistance to applicants in other categories defined
as "reasonable" and delineated in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10) (A) (ii).
See id. at 167, 712 A.2d at 193. Justice Stein noted that New Jersey's
"Medicaid Only" program is one such optional category, and it also
involves benefit determinations for married couples with spouses entering nursing facilities. See id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4D3i(15) (c) (1995)).
Justice Stein then discussed the "no more restrictive" methodology of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a) (10) (C) (i) (III) relied upon by the Appellate Division, as well as 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (a)(17), which mandates Medicaid eligibility standards that are "reasonable" and
"comparable" for all categories including the medically needy. See id.
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at 167-68, 712 A.2d at 193 (citing Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154
(1986)). The court recounted that the federal Medicaid statute prescribes a single income and resource eligibility standard for medically needy candidates. See id. Moreover, the court noted that the
Medicaid statute declares that the eligibility methodology applied to
such individuals can be "no more restrictive" than that used for the
categorically needy SSI applicants. See id. In applying the same "no
more restrictive" methodology to other optional benefit categories,
the court recognized that the methodology satisfies the statutory requirement if, when applied, "additional individuals may be eligible
for medical assistance and no existing eligible individuals are made
ineligible." Id. at 168, 712 AX2d at 193 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396
a(r)(2) (A),(B)). Referring to the Court's analysis in Atkins, Justice
Stein acknowledged that, although states are free to implement different eligibility levels for the categorically needy and the medically
needy, the "no more restrictive" provision requires that components
of income are treated similarly. See id. at 168-69, 712 A.2d at 194.
The court then turned to the Division's argument that the
"more restrictive" provision relied upon by the appellate division is
superseded by the "spousal impoverishment" provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA). See id. at 169, 712
A2d at 194. The justice explained that these provisions were enacted to prevent the impoverishment of community spouses after
their respective spouses were admitted to nursing homes. See id. at
169-70, 712 A.2d at 194 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-5). Justice Stein
stated the provisions' intent: to secure the independence and dignity
of non-institutionalized spouses by permitting them to shelter adequate, albeit not excessive, income and resources from the common
requirement to use marital assets to pay for nursing home costs, before institutionalized spouses become Medicaid eligible. See id.
Noting that the statute includes all marital assets in the eligibility analysis, the court maintained that the legislative intent also was
to protect the public from the unwarranted diversion of Medicaid
funds. See id. at 170-71, 712 A.2d at 194-95. The justice elaborated
on the statute's specific language by observing that the assessment of
the couple's aggregate resources is based on a "snapshot" view conducted at the onset of institutionalization. See id. at 171, 712 A.2d at
195 (referencing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-5(c)(1)(A) and N.J. Admin.
Code 10:714. 8(a) (1)). In order to prevent the pauperization of the
community spouse by the "spending down" of the couple's combined assets, the court found that the statute provided for a
"community spouse resource allowance." See id. The court explained that this allowance remained sheltered from the institution-
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alized spouse's Medicaid eligibility determination. See id. (citing 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396r-5(f)(2)).
Justice Stein confirmed that NewJersey regulations NJ. Admin.
Code 10:71-4.8(a) (1), (2) provide for such an allowance, not to exceed $76,740, and that marital assets in excess of this amount can be
included in the Medicaid eligibility determination of the institutionalized spouse. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-5(c)(2)(B)). The
court recognized that Sophie Mistrick exceeded the $2,000 resource
ceiling for Medicaid eligibility when the couple's combined assets
were re-configured under this regulatory framework. See id..
Next, and most importantly, the court declared that the provisions of the MCCA regarding eligibility determinations for institutionalized spouses expressly supersede any inconsistent provisions of
Subchapter XIX, 42 U.S.C.A § 1396-1396v. See id. Section 396r5(a)(1) to (3) of the MCCA states that the Act does not affect "the
determination of what constitutes income or resources," nor the
methodology used in this process. See id. at 172, 712 A.2d at 195.
However, the court noted that subsection 1396r-5(c)(5) indicates
that assets specifically exempted under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382b(a) or (d)
are not considered resources for eligibility purposes. See id. After
Justice Stein delineated the most significant assets excluded by both
the statute and relevant New Jersey regulations, the justice emphasized that pensions and IRAs are not on the list of such exclusions.
See id., 712 A.2d at 195-96. In other words, the court represented
that marital resources are included in the eligibility analysis unless
they are specifically excluded by the MCCA and its related statutory
and regulatory provisions. See id.
The court then addressed Sophie Mistrick's contention that,
pursuant to federal regulation 20 C.F.R. section 416.1202, a spouse's
pension fund or IRA should be excluded from such resource determinations. See id. at 172-73, 712 A.2d at 196. Justice Stein explained
that, in addition to exemptions for items such as the home and life
insurance, this regulation excludes from SSI benefit determinations
pension funds and IRAs in the name of the SSI ineligible spouse if
the applicant is living with the ineligible spouse. See id. at 173, 712
A.2d at 196. The court reminded the parties that unless specifically
excluded by these regulatory provisions, the couple's resources are
otherwise included in the benefit determination. See id. The justice
also noted that Sophie relied on the "no more restrictive" methodology of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a) (10) (c) (i) (III) to buttress her position
that the aforementioned regulation concerning SSI eligibility also
supports her application for medical benefits. See id.
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In rejecting the respondent's arguments, Justice Stein first asserted that the proferred federal regulation is not relevant to Sophie's eligibility determination. See id. at 174, 712 A.2d at 196.
While emphasizing its lack of general applicability in SSI eligibility
decisions, the justice stressed that the regulation excludes pension
plans and IRAs from such eligibility determinations only when the
spouses are living in the same household. See id. at 174-75, 712 A.2d
196-97. This was not Sophie's situation at the onset of her institutionalization. See id. Refusing to broaden the scope of this regulation, the court also determined that the regulation's application
should not be extended to the medically needy or other optional
Medicaid eligibility categories. See id. at 174, 712 A2d at 197.
The court concluded that Sophie's reliance on the "no more restrictive" provision to extend the regulation's SSI applicability to her
status as a medically needy applicant was without merit. See id. Justice Stein reiterated that the MCCA supersedes any provisions inconsistent with it, including the "no more restrictive" provision as applied in this case. See id. The justice further explained that the SSI
methodology excluding IRAs in 20 C.F.R. section 416.1202, was inconsistent with the MCCA which, by reference to 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1382b(a) and (d), requires their inclusion in the assessment of
available marital assets. See id. at 174-75, 712 A.2d at 197. For all the
discussed reasons, the court held thatJoseph's IRA was an includable
resource in deciding Sophie's medically needy Medicaid eligibility.
See id. at 174, 712 A2d at 197.
Finally, the court briefly addressed the issue of whetherJoseph's
IRA was an includable resource under New Jersey's "Medicaid Only"
program. See id. at 176, 712 A.2d at 197. Justice Stein observed that
under this program, assets must be "available" to the applicant in order to be considered in the benefit eligibility process. See id. (citing
N.J. Admin. Code 10:71-4.1(c)). Pointing out that this argument was
not proferred by the respondent, the court announced that similarly
situated parties seeking benefit eligibility would bear the burden of
proof to demonstrate such unavailability. See id., 712 A.2d at 198.
As the case analysis demonstrates, the laws governing Medicaid
eligibility determinations encompass a complicated network of both
federal and state statutes and regulations. Although the court's
thorough and well-articulated interpretations of these legislative enactments are technically correct, the result leaves much to be desired. Recognizing that it is not appropriate for courts to legislate,
the Mistrick court interpreted the applicable statutes to clarify a critical issue in a manner likely to have an enormous financial impact on
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an increasing number of couples as the population ages. Long-term
care facilities would now be required to utilize the retirement funds
of the institutionalized spouse to pay for medical expenses prior to
Medicaid eligibility and to access the pensions and IRAs of the community spouse.
Following Mistrick, the very goal of the MCCA to provide community spouses with enough resources to live with independence
and dignity may be imperiled. The court realized that in many cases
the legislative objective to prevent the impoverishment of community spouses, while ensuring that individuals contribute their fair
share prior to public subsidy, will be defeated if the legislatively determined community spouse resource allowance is inadequate to
meet that spouse's needs. See id. at 176-77, 712 A.2d at 198. Noninstitutionalized spouses may be forced to make decisions that the
MCCA itself intended to avoid. For example, they may need "to sue
their institutionalized spouses for support" or face premature institutionalization themselves. Id. at 170, 712 A.2d at 194. The prospect
of substantial financial dependence on their children presents yet
another unpleasant alternative for community spouses.
Working Americans have been encouraged to save for their retirement, and when they do so, they are justified in their expectations of a lifestyle better than mere subsistence at the public's expense. These citizens have contributed to the public good and to
the less fortunate over the years, largely through payroll tax deductions. It is unfair to deny these individuals full use of their own welldeserved retirement funds. Since such retirement planning is usually undertaken during the productive years and well in advance of
the predicaments such as those encountered by the Mistricks, there
is little likelihood of intentional sheltering of funds to avoid contributing one's fair share to medical expenses prior to Medicaid eligibility. As retirement funds are intended to pay for living expenses later
in life, society may need to re-evaluate its policies on how to care for
the institutionalized elderly and infirm. Although the court's interpretation of current Medicaid eligibility law is an accurate one, it is
highly probable that future legislation will be proposed to address
these issues of substantial public importance.
GregoryJ.Rokosz, D.0.
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PRECLUSION OF ERISA CLAIM AGAINST EMPLOYER WHERE PLAINTIFF
HAD PREVIOUSLY SUED TORTFEASOR AND EMPLOYER FOR NEGLIGENCE

- Fornarottov. American Waterworks Co., 144 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff Joseph Fornarotto began working for the New Jersey-American Water Company (NJ-American) on March 7, 1966, and
continued to work for the company until January 23, 1995. See
Fornarottov. American Waterworks Co., 144 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 1998). On
April 8, 1990, Fornarotto participated in a strike initiated by his labor
union. See id. at 277. While Fornarotto was picketing, another NJAmerican employee, Michael Chiapetta, struck Fornarotto with an
automobile. Fornarotto's injuries resulted in a ten-day hospital stay
and surgery, followed by several years of therapy. On June 11, 1990,
Fornarotto sued Chiapetta and NJ-American for negligence and personal injury in NewJersey Superior Court in Monmouth County.
Following the accident, Fornarotto was unable to work for long
periods of time and, therefore, ceased working on January 23, 1993.
Subsequently, NJ-American terminated Fornarotto on January 23,
1995. As an employee of NJ-American, Fornarotto was eligible for
the water company's pension plan. This plan made payments to
employees based upon the circumstances surrounding their termination. During the pendency of his personal injury suit, Fornarotto
sought disability benefits under NJ-American's plan. His requests for
benefits were denied, and the final administrative appeal was rejected on May 8, 1995.
On September 5, 1995, Fornarotto sued American Waterworks
and NJ-American in NewJersey Superior Court for disability benefits
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA). See id. at 278. On October 27, 1995, American Waterworks
and New Jersey-American removed the disability benefits action to
the United States District Court for the District of NewJersey. See id.
Shortly thereafter, American Waterworks and NJ-American moved
for summaryjudgment based on the entire controversy doctrine, and
on February 7, 1997, the district court granted the motion. See id.
The district court held that Fornarotto's ERISA suit was barred as it
emanated from the same controversy as Fornarotto's first personal
injury/negligence suit against Chiapetta and NJ-American. See id
Fornarotto then appealed the district court's ruling to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals. See id. The circuit court held that the en-
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tire controversy doctrine did not bar Fornarotto's claim for disability
benefits. See id. The court, therefore, reversed the district court's
judgment and remanded the case for trial. See id.
Judge McKee, writing for the majority, began by describing the
entire controversy doctrine as a variant of conventional res judicata
principles. See id. Judge McKee relied upon Venuto v. Witco Corp. to
explain the entire controversy doctrine's threefold objectives: (1) a
"comprehensive and conclusive determination of a legal controversy," (2) party fairness, and (3) judicial economy. Id. (citing Venuto
v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754 (3d Cir. 1997)). Judge McKee explained
that the entire controversy doctrine is embodied in NewJersey Court
Rule 4:30A, which mandates that all claims relating to the same controversy be initiated in one action or face preclusion from future actions. See id. The court then commented on the difficulty the application of the doctrine presents and compared it to the "infamous"
Rule Against Perpetuities. See id. at 278-79.
The court next quoted at length from DiTrolio v. Antilles, 142
NJ. 253, 662 A.2d 494 (N.J. 1995), wherein the NewJersey Supreme
Court explained that the issue in an entire controversy doctrine inquiry is the sharing, by multiple claims, of a core set of facts. See
Fornarotto,144 F.3d at 279 (citing DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 266, 662 A.2d at
501). The court noted that in DiTrolio the New Jersey Supreme
Court established one test to determine whether or not claims were
related. See id. (citing DiTrolio, 142 NJ. at 266, 662 A.2d at 501). The
court explained that, in particular, the test is whether the parties can
conclusively dispose of their bundle of rights and liabilities arising
from a single transaction in one action. See id Judge McKee declared that the key problem in applying the New Jersey rule is determining when exactly a set of lawsuits represents "'a single transaction or a series of transactions.'" Id. (quoting DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at
265, 662 A-2d at 501). The circuitjudge concluded that Fornarotto's
claims for disability benefits and his earlier claims against Chiapetta
and NJ-American for negligence "share[d] the common fact of his
injuries." Id. However, Judge McKee pronounced that the entire
controversy doctrine was not applicable because the "relationship of
the parties and successive claims" in the two suits did not constitute a
single transaction. Id.
The circuit court contrasted the facts detailing Fornarotto's injury and lawsuits with those in DiTrolio. See id. In DiTrolio, Judge
McKee explained that the plaintiff commenced his first suit against
the hospital at which he was employed and the second suit against
four other physicians also employed by the hospital. See id. (citing
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DiTrolio v. Antilles, 142 NJ. at 265, 662 A.2d at 501). The court stated
that the NewJersey Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the second suit, which concerned the denial of DiTrolio's promotion, pursuant to the entire controversy doctrine. See id. Judge McKee noted
that the core of the New Jersey Supreme Court's inquiry into the
connection of the claims at issue in DiTrolio was whether they arose
from a commonality of facts. See id. at 279-80. Similarly, Judge
McKee acknowledged that Fornarotto's claim was predicated upon
Chiapetta's negligence. See id. at 280. However, the judge further
stated that this coincidence did not mandate preclusion under the
entire controversy doctrine. See id.
The court then described the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning in Joel v. Morrocco, 147 N.J. 546, 688 A.2d 1036 (N.J. 1997), as
illustrative of the requirement ofjoinder of claims in NewJersey. See
id. Judge McKee explained that in Joel as in Fornarotto,the separate
causes of action were distinct and did not constitute "calculated
fragmentation of litigation." See id. The court proceeded to distinguish Fornarotto's personal injury claim from his ERISA suit. See id.
First, the court observed that Fornarotto would not need to prove
any of the traditional tort elements in his ERISA action, with the exception of the fact that he was disabled. See id. The court then declared that even without negligence, Fornarotto's disability claim
would still exist and that this was not a case in which a plaintiff would
be taking "two bites at the apple." See id. Although the court acknowledged that Fornarotto conceded that his two suits did arise
from common facts, the court insisted that any overlap that existed
between the two suits was "rooted more in serendipity and coincidence than commonality of facts" and said that a trial would not require a "rerun" of the prior litigation. Id.
Judge McKee next explored the similar facts of Illiano v. Seaview
Orthopedics, 299 N.J. Super. 99, 690 A.2d 662 (App. Div. 1997). See
Fornarotto,144 F.3d at 280-81. The Third Circuit explained that the
Illiano court held that the plaintiffs claim against his treating physician, whose erroneous medical reports had caused Illiano to lose his
original personal injury suit, was not barred by the entire controversy
doctrine. See id. at 281. The circuit court further explained that the
causal relationship in Illiano was fortuitous and the causes of action
involved in the two proceedings were sufficiently distinct so as not to
constitute the same controversy. See id. Judge McKee then reiterated
the court's view that Fornarotto's claim also arose from "an altogether different relationship having its own set of responsibilities
and obligations." Id.
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The circuit court next analogized to Chiacchio v. Chiacchio, 198
N.J. Super. 1, 486 A.2d 335 (App. Div. 1984). See id. Judge McKee
explained that the Chiacchio court stated that claims by a wife against
her husband for divorce and personal injury and claims by the wife
and husband against their insurance carrier for indemnification
arose from two distinct sets of rights and liabilities. See id,at 282.
The Chiacchio court stated that for the divorce and personal injury
claims, the relationship was that of tortfeasor/victim and husband/wife, and reasoned that for the coverage claim, the relationship was that of insurer/insured. See id. Judge McKee noted that the
Chiacchio court did not mandate that the two sets of claims be joined.
See id.
Judge McKee then seemed to chide the district court for applying the entire controversy doctrine to dismiss Fornarotto's ERISA
claim and thereby ignore considerations of fairness and equity. See
id. The court cited passages from Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orange,
116 N.J. 7, 560 A.2d 1169 (N.J. 1989) and DiTrolio to buttress the
proposition that party fairness is of paramount importance when applying the entire controversy doctrine. See Fornarotto, 144 F.3d at 282.
The Third Circuit suggested that considerations of fairness can overcome the strict mandates of joinder rules in NewJersey. See id. The
court explained that Fornarotto's employer would suffer no unfairness if the second action had continued. See id. at 283. Further, the
court noted that the defendant employer's tactical manipulation of
procedural rules first determined that there would be two actions
rather than one. See id. The court noted that if the employer had
not removed the case to federal court, the cases might have been
consolidated at the state level, thereby alleviating any burden of
repetition. See id.
Judge McKee stated that a key consideration in the application
of the entire controversy doctrine is whether or not a claimant has
the opportunity to assert every claim against every party in one action. See id. The judge then acknowledged that Fornarotto could
have amended his initial complaint in the negligence action, in
which his employer was already named as a defendant, rather than
file a separate suit against his employer. See id. The court, nevertheless, declared that this did not "tip the scales of fairness toward New
Jersey American's side of this dispute." Id. The circuit court described Fornarotto's pension plan as a fundamental part of his longstanding employment contract with the water company. See id. The
court stated that because there was nothing in the record to suggest
that Fornarotto was anything less than a good employee, fairness
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would not be served by prohibiting him from pursuing his contractual right to benefits. See id.
Judge McKee then distinguished Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
96 N.J. 336, 476 A.2d 250 (N.J. 1984), and Cogdell from the present
case. See Fornarotto, 144 F.3d at 283. The court noted that the plaintiffs in Crispin and Cogdell both deliberately fragmented their claims,
whereas Fornarotto, Judge McKee opined, had not intentionally
fragmented this litigation. See id The circuit court suggested that
although it was the plaintiff's decision to initiate two proceedings, it
was the defendant water company's removal to federal court that
precluded consolidation. See id. The Third Circuit explained that
under NewJersey Court Rule 4:5-1 (b) (2), litigants in NewJersey state
courts must notify the trial court of any related action, something
Fornarotto's attorney neglected to do at the time of filing the ERISA
suit. See id. at 283-84. Judge McKee explained that although
Fornarotto's lawyer failed to follow the rules, and even certified to
the state trial court in the ERISA action that no related litigation existed, the defendants would have been compelled to notify the court
of the related action upon answering the complaint. See id. at 284.
The court stressed that this was a case in which the defendant had
intentionally avoided consolidation in state court in order to use the
lack of consolidation as a shield from a just and fair claim. See id.
The Third Circuit concluded by reiterating that the entire controversy doctrine is grounded in equity, that fairness is an important
limit on the doctrine's application, and that its applicability is subject
to the court's discretion. See id. at 284-85. The court, therefore, proclaimed that Fornarotto's ERISA claim did not trigger the preclusive
effects of the entire controversy doctrine. See id. at 285.
Judge Nygaard, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's holding
and stated that the district court had correctly applied the entire
controversy doctrine because both Fornarotto's lawsuits arose from
the same "core set of facts." See id at 285 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
Judge Nygaard noted that any consideration of whether or not
causes of action are distinct is immaterial when two suits "derive
from the same event." See id. The judge stressed that inquiry into a
commonality of legal issues is irrelevant to an application of the entire controversy doctrine and that a New Jersey court had never refused to apply the entire controversy doctrine based solely on fairness. See id. at 285-86. The judge emphasized that the fairness
inquiry should focus on whether a plaintiff could have asserted all
claims in one action. See id. at 286. The dissent further explained
that Fornarotto had ample opportunity to join his ERISA claim, but
that he or his attorney chose not to join them. See id. The judge im-
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plied that any unfairness Fornarotto suffered was a result of his attorney's lack of astuteness in (1) filing a separate suit rather than
amending the suit pending, and (2) failing to notify the state trial
court hearing the ERISA claim of the related pending personal injury action as required by statute. See id.
In holding that NewJersey's entire controversy doctrine did not
preclude Fornarotto's ERISA claim, the Third Circuit has stretched
the limits of the doctrine's relatedness-of-claims inquiry. The majority defined the issue as whether multiple legal claims arise from a series of transactions or from a single transaction, and the court cited
to New Jersey cases that emphasize that any entire controversy inquiry should be focused on the core set of facts underlying the
claims. The circuit court characterized the core set of facts in
Fornarotto's case as concentrated around the relationship between
the parties rather than around the circumstances of Fornarotto's accident. The Third Circuit characterized the issue in this way to support its belief that it would be unfair to allow a defendant, who rendered consolidation in the state court impossible by removing to
federal court, subsequently to use the same lack of consolidation as a
preclusive shield.
In so ruling, however, the circuit court de-emphasized the obvious errors of Fornarotto's counsel. It is true that if Fornarotto's
ERISA claim were precluded, Fornarotto's only remedy might have
been damages against his own lawyer for malpractice. It is questionable, however, whether avoiding this inadequate result justifies the
Third Circuit's setting a new standard for what degree of fragmentation will be permitted in federal courts that are called upon to interpret this NewJersey rule. What is at risk is an interpretation in federal courts of a state doctrine that differs from the interpretation of
that doctrine by state courts.
Janine Tramontana
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NEGLIGENCE - PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS - ONCE A PLAINTIFF
SATISFIES THE REDUCED BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
INCREASED RISK, A JURY SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE
DOCTRINE OF NONPERFORMANCE OF DIAGNOSTIC TESTS INCREASED
THE RISK OF HARM AND WAS A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR IN CAUSING THE
ULTIMATE INJURY Gardner v. Pawliw, 150 NJ. 359, 696 A.2d 599

(1997).
Linda Gardner (Gardner) had an obstetrical and gynecological
history of miscarriages and a hormonal deficiency. See Gardner v.
Pawliw, 150 NJ. 359, 363, 696 A.2d 599, 601 (1997). Pregnant again

in the spring of 1988, Gardner hoped to avoid another miscarriage
by securing the services of a recommended obstetrician who specialized in high-risk pregnancies. Based on a referral, Gardner consulted Dr. Myron Pawliw on June 1, 1988. Dr. Pawliw, after learning
of Gardner's medical history and concerns, assured her that his assistance could produce a successful pregnancy. See id. at 363-64, 696
A.2d at 601.
With a due date of January 20, 1989, Gardner saw Dr. Pawliw for
prenatal care on monthly and then bi-weekly bases into the third
trimester. See id. at 364-65, 696 A.2d at 602. Throughout this period,
medical reports indicated normal fetal development. See id. at 365,
696 A.2d at 602. However, on December 21, 1988, Gardner noticed
a marked decrease in fetal movement combined with a watery vaginal
discharge. During a scheduled visit later the same day, Dr. Pawliw
examined Gardner, measured for fetal growth, took her blood pressure, performed a urinalysis, and listened for the fetal heartbeat.
The doctor performed no other diagnostic tests. Assuring Gardner
that there were no problems with the pregnancy, Dr. Pawliw attributed the prior lack of movement to fetal sleep.
In the days immediately subsequent, Gardner noticed intermittent levels of fetal movement. See id. at 366, 696 A.2d at 603. Relying
on Dr. Pawliw's previous explanation, Gardner believed the fetus was
sleeping on December 26, 1988, when she felt no fetal movement.
The following day, Gardner went to Dr. Pawliw's office for an examination after again noticing no fetal movement. At this time, Dr.
Pawliw ordered a Biophysical Profile and ultrasound scan for Gardner when he failed to find the heartbeat of the fetus. The results of
these tests indicated that the fetus had died. That same evening, a
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nurse and Gardner's husband delivered the stillborn fetus. Dr.
Pawliw missed the delivery.
The Gardners commenced a medical malpractice action against
Dr. Pawliw on March 20, 1990. See id. Their complaint alleged that
his negligent nonperformance of certain diagnostic tests, particularly
a Biophysical Profile and a Non-Stress Test, on December 21, 1988,
contributed to an increased risk of fetal death. See id. at 367, 696
X-2d at 603. The complaint further alleged that this risk was a substantial factor in the death of the fetus. See id. During a three-day
jury trial, the Gardners presented testimony from two expert witnesses. See id. First, a forensic pathologist, Dr. James Lewis, testified
that the autopsy results suggested that abnormalities of the placenta
and umbilical cord produced the fetal death. See id. According to
his autopsy analysis, Dr. Lewis concluded that the fetus had been
alive on December 21. See id. at 368, 696 A.2d at 603. Second, Dr.
Marvin Kalafer testified for the Gardners that the nonperformance
of the diagnostic tests increased the risk that Dr. Pawliw would not
recognize a preexistent condition that threatened survival of the fetus. See id. at 369, 696 A.2d at 605. However, Dr. Kalafer offered no
opinion concerning the condition of the fetus on December 21. See
id. at 368, 696 A-2d at 604. On behalf of the defendant, Dr. Sidney
Wilchins testified that the abnormalities revealed by the autopsy
would have eluded the diagnostic tests. See id. at 370, 696 A.2d at
605.
At the close of evidence, the trial court dismissed the Gardners's
complaint. See id. at 362, 696 A.2d at 601. The trial court held that
the Gardners had failed to prove the necessary causal connection between the defendant's alleged malpractice in failing to administer
the diagnostic tests and the ultimate fetal death. See id. at 363, 372,
696 A.2d at 601, 606. Because Dr. Kalafer had declined definitively
to state the probability that the tests would have indicated abnormalities, the trial court concluded that the Gardners insufficiently
established the requisite causal link between the doctor's negligence
and the increased risk of an undiagnosed preexistent condition. See
id. at 373, 696 A.2d at 607.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the complaint. See id. at 363, 696 A.2d at
601. The appellate division held that the Gardners produced inadequate evidence that Dr. Pawliw's failure to perform the diagnostic
tests on December 21, 1988, resulted in an increased risk of harm
from a preexistent condition. See id. at 374, 696 A.2d at 607. Specifically, the appellate division found that the Gardners failed to meet
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their burden of proof on the issue of causation because Dr. Kalafer,
their medical expert, expressed no firm opinion (1) on the condition of the fetus on the day Dr. Pawliw failed to perform the tests,
and (2) on the possibility or probability that those diagnostic tests
would have indicated any abnormalities. See id. at 363, 696 A.2d at
601. The court acknowledged that plaintiffs' expert had opined that
the nonperformance of the tests increased the risk that the obstetrician would not recognize a potentially fatal fetal condition. See id. at
374, 696 A.2d at 608. The appellate division, therefore, concluded
that the Gardners failed to prove the requisite causative link because
their expert could only suggest a remote chance or slight possibility
that the failure to perform diagnostic tests increased the risk of fetal
death. See id.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification. See id.
at 363, 696 A.2d at 601 (citing Gardner v. Pawliw, 146 N.J. 496, 683
A.2d 199 (1996)). The court held that the trial court erred in preventing the jury from considering whether the obstetrician's nonperformance of diagnostic tests increased the risk of fetal death and
whether any increased risk constituted a substantial factor contributing to the death. See id.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stein began the opinion by
clarifying the standard of proof for establishing proximate cause in
medical-malpractice negligence actions particularly involving plaintiffs with preexistent conditions. See id. at 375, 696 A.2d at 608. Noting the concurrence of the majority of jurisdictions, the court recounted its earlier liberalization of the traditional "but for" causation
standard for a narrowed class of malpractice actions.
See id.
(citations omitted). Reiterating this modified standard, the majority
remarked that plaintiffs with preexisting conditions are required to
prove that a defendant's negligence caused an increased risk of injury from that condition and that the increased risk was a substantial
causative factor which produced the ultimate harm. See id. (citing
Anderson v. Picciotta, 144 N.J. 195, 676 A2d 127 (1996)).
Crafting a context for the court's decision, Justice Stein then
traced the court's development of the doctrine of increased risk in
malpractice litigation. See id. at 377-79, 696 A.2d at 609-11. The
court focused first on its decision in Evers v. Dollinger, the case in
which the court initially adopted the increased risk doctrine. See id.
at 376-77, 696 A.2d at 609 (citing Evers v. Dolinger,95 N.J. 399, 471
A.2d 405 (1984)). The impulse underlying the doctrinal adoption in
Evers, the majority noted, is judicial recognition of the practical
proof difficulties associated with malpractice cases in which a pa-
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tient's preexistent condition itself serves as a conventional "but for"
cause of the ultimate injury. See id. at 377, 696 A.2d at 609. The majority in Evers realized, the court continued, that isolation of the
causal factor is difficult when defendant's negligence and plaintiff's
preexistent condition constitute concurrent causes of the injury. See
id. Therefore, Justice Stein stressed that the doctrine of increased
risk implicitly attends to the problem of proof in such cases by furnishing a more flexible and lower-threshold standard for establishing
proximate causation. See id.
Continuing its review of the doctrinal development of increased
risk, the majority next discussed the seminal case of Scafidi v. Seiler,
which introduced a two-prong test for establishing causation in preexistent condition cases. See id. at 378-79, 696 A.2d at 610 (citing
Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93, 574 A.2d 398 (1990)). Justice Stein recited the first prong of the test, which requires plaintiff to demonstrate "'within a reasonable degree of medical probability'" that defendant's negligence increased the risk of injury from a preexistent
condition. Id. at 378, 696 A.2d at 610 (quoting Scafidi, 119 N.J. at
108, 574 A.2d 398). The court concluded that a plaintiff raises ajury
question by producing adequate evidence to satisfy the first prong.
See id. The second prong of the test, the majority maintained, implicates the substantial factor causation standard. See id. Relying on the
language of Scafidi, Justice Stein opined that this relaxed standard of
causation invites a jury to decide whether the negligent treatment
was a significant factor inducing the eventual harm sufficient to meet
the requirement of proximate cause. See id. at 379, 696 AN2d at 610.
The court underscored that a plaintiff, in satisfying the first prong of
the test, would usually use expert medical testimony. See id., 696
A.2d at 611. To satisfy the first prong, a plaintiff must necessarily
prove that a chance of avoiding the injury existed, the court contended, but a court may permit a plaintiff to present evidence speculative in nature. See id.
Justice Stein then focused on the particular quandary posed for
a malpractice action when a physician's negligence consists of the
nonperformance of diagnostic tests. See id. at 379-80, 696 A.2d at
611. The majority reasoned that the very omission of diagnostic tests
as potential sources of proof might preclude a medical expert from
testifying to a reasonable degree of probability about scenarios that
might have followed the proper administration of tests. See id. at
380, 696 A.2d at 611. Indeed, the court commented that the holdings of the lower courts centered on the testimonial failure of the
Gardners's medical expert to offer a reasonable probability on the
matter of test results that never occurred. See id. Portending the rea-
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soning to follow, the justice acknowledged the contentions of the
Gardners that the analysis of the lower courts was too stringent, departed from the policy underlying the controlling precedents, and
permitted the obstetrician to benefit from the uncertainty created by
his own negligence. See id. The key issue, the majority announced,
was the degree of certainty, as a matter of reasonable probability,
demanded of expert testimony to prove the causal connection between the plaintiffs injury and the health care provider's negligent
nonperformance of potentially beneficial diagnostic tests. See id.
The issue thus framed, Justice Stein next surveyed decisions
from other jurisdictions that previously had addressed the same issue. See id. at 380-84, 696 A.2d at 611-13. The court commented that
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had considered the question of
the quantum of proof required under the accepted standard of reasonable medical probability for expert medical opinions. See id. at
380, 696 A.2d at 611. (citing Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa.
1978)). The Pennsylvania court emphasized, the majority observed,
that the responsibility of balancing the probabilities falls on the jury,
not on the medical expert. See id. at 382, 696 A.2d at 612. Similarly,
the Supreme Court of Arizona, Justice Stein stated, decided that a
determination on the issue of causation is the province of the jury
when an expert witness is incapable of quantifying the exact probability of complete recovery. See id. (citing Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984)). Summarizing the apparent prevailing view among jurisdictions, the justice averred that as
long as expert testimony establishes that a doctor's malpractice increased a patient's risk of harm, the plaintiff should retain the opportunity for ajury to evaluate the proffered proof, especially where
a physician's failure to act prevents a plaintiff from exactly quantifying the effect of that same negligence. See id. at 384, 696 A2d at 613.
The court reviewed persuasive authority from other jurisdictions
holding that plaintiffs may prove increased risk of harm when an expert, though unable to quantify the exact increase in risk, nonetheless testifies that a physician should have ordered diagnostic tests in
light of discoverable manifest symptoms. See id. (citations omitted).
Turning from other jurisdictions to a previous decision of its
own, the court detailed the defining elements of the increased risk
case Olah v. Slobodian. See id. at 384-87, 696 A.2d at 613-15 (citing
Olah v. Slobodian, 119 NJ. 119, 574 A.2d 411 (1990)). Justice Stein
highlighted that in Olah the court distinctly disapproved the notion
that a plaintiffs proofs must quantify the probability that unperformed diagnostic tests necessarily would have avoided the ultimate
harm. See id. at 386, 696 A.2d at 614. In that case, the majority in-
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sisted, the court emphasized that a jury's conclusion on the issues of
negligence and increased risk subsumes the issue of probability. See
id. Closing its consideration of Olah, the court clarified the threshold inquiry relevant to the instant case. See id. at 387, 696 A.2d at
614. Justice Stein surmised that ajury determines the significance of
any increased risk of harm if a plaintiff proves first that negligence
increased the risk. See id. at 386-87, 696 A.2d at 614.
The doctrinal foundation set, the justice pronounced a refined
Scafidi standard for increased-risk cases. See id. at 387, 696 A.2d at
615. The court concluded that when a physician deviates from a
prevailing standard of care by not performing diagnostic tests, but
the results of the unperformed tests are unknown, a basic requirement follows from the first prong of Scafidi. See id. The first prong
of Scafidi, the court cautioned, does not require that a plaintiff demonstrate within a reasonable degree of medical probability that a diagnostic test would have avoided the injury definitively. See id. The
majority asserted that the proper requirement invites a plaintiff to
establish the probability that the nonperformance of tests increased
the risk of injury from a preexistent condition. See id. Accenting the
point, Justice Stein explained that a plaintiff may establish an increased risk of injury even if a diagnostic test is useful in only a small
number of cases. See id. Unveiling the rationale underlying its conclusion, the court focused on the preferable policy result implied by
its decision. See id. If trial courts invariably refuse plaintiffs the opportunity to reach the jury in complicated cases involving diagnostic
tests, Justice Stein warned, defendants will benefit from the evidentiary uncertainties created by their own failure to conduct adequate
testing. See id. The majority maintained that its decision was fashioned to prevent such an "unacceptable result." See id.
Justice Stein then applied the foregoing principles to the rulings by the lower courts. See id. at 387-89, 696 A.2d at 615-16. The
justice noted that the trial court dismissed the Gardners's cause of
action because their medical expert did not testify within a reasonable medical probability that diagnostic tests would have indicated
fetal abnormalities of the umbilical cord and placenta. See id. at 388,
696 A.2d at 615. The majority rejected the conclusion of the trial
court that the first prong of Scafidi is satisfied only by relating the
reasonable medical probability standard to the likely outcome of the
test. See id. The reasonable medical probability requirement, the
court found, properly applies to the issue of increased risk of injury
from a preexistent condition. See id. The court chided both lower
courts for erroneously concluding that the Gardners produced insufficient proof of increased risk to send the proximate cause question

19981

SURVEYS

to the jury. See id. Justice Stein suggested that the Gardners had the
burden of establishing that the obstetrician's failure to perform the
diagnostic tests increased the risk of in utero fetal death in general,
rather than to show, as the lower courts held, that the tests would
have revealed the specific abnormalities of the umbilical cord and
placenta. See id. The justice declared that the Gardners satisfied
their burden when their medical expert, Dr. Kalafer, testified that
the nonperformance of tests by Dr. Pawliw increased the risk that a
potentially fatal condition would remain undetected. See id. at 389,
696 A.2d at 616. Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court
should have permitted the Gardners to submit to the jury the issue
of proximate causation. See id.
Justice Stein quickly qualified the court's holding. See id. at 38990, 696 A.2d at 616. The holding, the justice noted, should not imply that the probable significance of test outcomes would have been
irrelevant to the result of the litigation. See id. at 389, 696 A.2d at
616. Rather, the court characterized the substantial factor causation
standard employed by ajury as incorporating an implicit probability
inquiry. See id. Further, Justice Stein pointed out that Scafidi requires that comparative fault principles govern jury apportionment
of fault. See id. at 390, 696 A.2d at 616-17. Justice Stein stressed that
the appellate division erred in characterizing Dr. Kalafer's testimony
as an unsubstantiated conclusion inadequate to meet the requisite
causation standard. See id. at 390, 696 A2d at 616. The justice discerned that the lower court misperceived the applicable standard of
proof. See id. Contrary to the conclusion of the appellate division,
the court countered that the factual evidence adequately supported
Dr. Kalafer's expert medical testimony to raise ajury question on the
issue of the obstetrician's liability. See id. at 391, 696 A.2d at 617.
Concluding the opinion, the majority restated the holding that the
trial court should have permitted the jury to consider the questions
whether the obstetrician's nonperformance of diagnostic tests increased the risk of fetal injury and whether such risk was a substantial
factor in the death of the fetus. See id. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the appellate division and remanded the case
to the trial court for a new trial. See id.
Justice Pollock, in a dissenting opinion, posited that the Gardners's case should fail because their medical expert, Dr. Kalafer, offered nothing more than a "net opinion." See id. at 391-92, 696 A.2d
at 617 (Pollock, J., dissenting). The justice invoked the net opinion
rule, which holds that the testimony of an expert must fail as an impermissible net opinion if the testimony is insufficiently supported
by a factual basis. See id. at 392, 696 A.2d at 617 (Pollock, J., dissent-
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ing). The dissent determined that the rule is grounded on the failure of an expert to establish the requisite causal connection between
an alleged negligent act and an alleged injury. See id. Agreeing with
the findings of the trial court and appellate division, Justice Pollock
propounded that the testimony of Dr. Kalafer for the Gardners inadequately provided a factual basis for his conclusion that the obstetrician's failure to conduct diagnostic tests increased the risk of fetal
death. See id. at 393, 696 A.2d at 618 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Dispensing with the majority's measurement of the expert's testimony
against the lower increased-risk standard of causation, the dissent
discredited Dr. Kalafer's testimony by asserting that vague medical
statements cannot salvage a net opinion. See id. Justice Pollock postulated that the Gardners failed to establish their case even under
the liberalized increased risk standard. See id. at 394, 696 A.2d at 619
(Pollock, J., dissenting). Tacitly rebuffing the majority, the justice
adopted the view that alteration of a legal standard does not necessarily suffice to save a net opinion. See id. at 394-95, 696 A.2d at 619
(Pollock, J., dissenting). Metaphorically admonishing the court for
the absence of an adequate factual foundation, Justice Pollock punctuated his dissent by describing the court's opinion as "an artistically
designed castle in the air." Id. at 395, 696 A.2d at 619 (Pollock, J.,
dissenting).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reasonably resolved a legal
variant of the difficult what-might-have-been problem. Cases involving concurrent causes of harm are not naturally amenable to uncomplicated judicial resolution. Given the complications, the court
correctly confronted an objectionable outcome left unattended by
the lower courts: Health care providers would evade liability because
of the evidentiary uncertainties engendered by their own negligent
omissions. Both the trial court and appellate division sought quantifiable probabilities where none were possible. The lower courts perpetuated the perverse irony of requiring plaintiffs to prove the probable results of tests that the defendant put beyond the realm of
realization. Unwilling to accept that result, the court placed on the
jury the responsibility for making the logical and legal leap from increased risk to causation. Admittedly, such a solution licenses a degree of jury speculation about a hypothetical alternative set of circumstances. The defendant's own failure to act, however, created
the conditions for that eventual jury conjecture. Further, the jury is
the traditional repository for lodging such determinations on
proximate causation. If Solomonic certainty on causation is not pos-
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sible in cases such as Gardner,perhaps the outcome is best left to the
judgment of ajury.
Thomas Weisert

